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The text reconstructs the protocol of 'victory' as part of the interruption of enmity and establishment 
of temporary peace. Different understandings of the enemy and enmity imply that victory in war and 
cessation of conflict can essentially determine the way war is conducted, and that they follow rules of 
war. Victory is supposed to be a crucial moment that characterizes the ethics of war. Particular 
testimonies and thematizations of victory in the Orthodox Christian tradition can provide an intro-
duction into a potential ethics of war that could ensure a new relationship towards the enemy and 
killing the enemy. 
 
Keywords:  ethics of war, victory, peace, enemy, interruption of enmity 
 
 
       
To begin to explain the title of this attempt to determine 'victory' (in war) and reconstruct 
the various protocols that constitute it, consider a rather new and vague phrase: "the Ortho-
dox or Eastern Christian ethics of war" (the "ethics of war," constructed in January 1915 by 
Bertrand Russell1 and quite current in the last fifty years, is developed in the direction of 
uncovering decisive and necessary arguments for the use of violence). I find that the vari-
ous justifications of force and violence, as well as the diverse reflections of justification of 
war made in imperial Russia, and then also partially in the Soviet Union, along with occa-
sional attempts at explaining violence and war in other predominantly Orthodox Christian 
states (Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria), could be ascribed to an "ethics of war" substantively de-
termined by this Christian faith. However, ethics of war is at present not taught in Russian 
military academies, nor can it be found in ethics or political theory syllabi (or agendas). 
                                                          
 
1 Cf. B. Russell, "The Ethics of War," in: The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 25, n. 2, January 
1915. 




Even among themselves, intellectuals, that is, philosophers, do not debate the justification 
of war in contemporary conditions, nor do they thematize military interventions the Russian 
military conducts concomitantly with NATO forces and the American military. Even 
though Russian philosophers have written about war since at least the mid-19th century (one 
author even uses the contemporary phrase "phenomenology of war" [fenomenologija 
vojni]), since war presents a huge dilemma and test both with regard to their religion and 
Russia's generally ambitious imperial aspirations, victory in World War II and post-war 
socialism have meant that war is not spoken, written, or thought about; use of violence by 
the state and military actions are discussed only within the Politburo, without the presence 
of public intellectuals. Although the Soviet army conducted several military interventions 
after WWII, the number of which is unclear, and led a long and draining war in Afghani-
stan, yet war experiences have not translated into various ethical problems – most important 
among them the distinction between just and unjust wars. 
 Given that today Russia shares all major problems of the West and Western democ-
racies (members of the European Union and candidate countries) and the world in general – 
a shift in the concept of safety and theory of security grounded in ethical principles, the 
fight against terrorism, new technologies in the use of force and their justification, virtual 
crime and war, the relationship to the civilian population, collateral damage, etc. – public 
discourse about these problems are the task and duty of the critical intellectual. His task is 
to address the public with his reflections regarding old and new problems of use of force 
and violence in service of the political and military leadership, enabling it to make the right 
decisions, while at the same time limiting their military might by placing them before pub-
lic scrutiny and judgment.  
 By introducing the phrase "the Orthodox Christian ethics of war,"2 my idea can be 
hypothetically explained in several steps: first, I seek to show that within the Russian tradi-
                                                          
 
2 Angeliki Laiou's "The Just War of Eastern Christians and the Holy War of the Crusaders" (The 
Ethics of War. Shared Problems in Different Traditions, eds. R. Sorabji & D. Rodin, Oxford 2006, 
30–43), which was supposed to be a contribution to the understanding of war among Orthodox Chris-
tians within an overall and general "ethics of war" (close or in common to all world religions), insuf-
ficiently or inappropriately advances a true construction of understanding and justifying the use of 
force that might be called orthodox. Cf. P. Bojanic, "Violence and 'Counter-Violence. On Correct 
Rejection. A Sketch of a Possible Russian Ethics of War Considered through the Understanding of 
Violence in Tolstoy and in Petar II Petrovic Njegos," in: RUDN Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, n. 2, 
657–658. 




tion, in the Russian language, there already was a living, theoretically viable, and active 
current of war thematization in the first half of the 20th century (until World War II), within 
the Soviet Union, as well as in emigration. Reflections on war, reconstructions of pacifism, 
incredibly lively debates about the justification of the use of force against violence of the 
aggressor are in moments far ahead of the arguments and various theories their colleagues, 
concomitantly writing in other European languages, are putting forth. An ideal task is to 
identify all the most important texts and books from this period (again, in emigration and the 
Soviet Union) in philosophy, law, politics, and literature. Above all, it is necessary to pay 
particular attention to the study of the relation of force (violence) and law, and the reconstruc-
tion of two crucial ideas: a) that force or violence has nothing to do with right, and b) that 
right or justice or some institutional order cannot be produced without the use of force.  
 The second step refers to the various intellectual problems of the period – belonging 
to different ideologies, living in the Soviet Union or abroad – write about, attempting to "con-
nect" with and "incorporate" the extremely sparse information about the military operations of 
the Soviet army after the Second World War in countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. It is 
very important to uncover and formulate a potential doctrine of Russian warfare and limit to 
use of force (the source of which are Marxism-Leninism, the theory of use of force in Ortho-
dox Christianity, thematization of force in civil war, peoples' defense, and brutal imperial-
colonial rule in countries of Eastern Europe). Such a doctrine would certainly imply a recon-
struction of various ethical problems that appear in various forms of warfare and use of force.  
 The third point would concern the comparison and juxtaposition of these results with 
contemporary "just war" theories and "ethics of war," which have been formulated above all 
in the Anglophone world from the period of the Vietnam war to the wars against terrorism. 
Since there are no texts that explicate the Russian, Soviet or Orthodox Christian conduct of 
war, this will be an opportunity to draw a precise distinction between two "war ethics." 
 My intention is to provide, in a few steps, a preliminary explanation of the nature of 
victory: what is to win or lose, and the various meanings of these words. Further, I want to 
know how this protocol functions in different competitive practices, in battle, in the ethics of 
war and in the ethics of war's end (that is, the transfer from ius victoriae to ius post bellum). 
'Victory', and all the moments and layers tied to this complex term, could potentially reveal 
that the idea of victory as cessation and end of war and violence are of substantive importance 
for an Orthodox ethics of war; the term 'victory' can be the basis of construction of differentia-
tion from Western versions of ethics of war and battle. 




 Victory is the cessation or interruption of violence, but always temporarily ended. Still, 
when interrupted, how is it interrupted, what are the conditions for its interruption? How is the 
cessation of violence announced and what gives it validity? (Certainly, one of the conditions 
for it is a declaration accepted by not only the victor and the defeated, but also 'the third'; 
since it is documented – e.g., capitulation, written acknowledgment, agreement of reparation, 
etc. – victory or defeat is a "social fact" or "institutional fact.") 
 Always difficult to define in simple terms,3 the following is a set of unconditional 
conditions of victory (and analogously, but not necessarily, defeat), which will help us 
reconstruct the characteristic of victory that would potentially allow violence and damage 
to be significantly reduced and not recur. Victory is determined above all by the relation to 
or treatment of the enemy or foe. Explicitly or implicitly, the relation towards the enemy 
conditions a few other characteristics of victory: the first is the institution of help in arriving 
at victory and all the variants of support given (or obstruction) to the victor, as "victory is 
never mine alone" or "I have won (or lost) thanks to some other" (friend, ally, God, guardi-
an angel, witch, etc.); the second characteristic of victory concerns the way in which it is 
achieved – whether victory is necessarily immoral, meaning that its achievement requires 
the use of means and acts outside the rules of a fair duel.  
 I would like to ascribe the last two characteristics of victory (de facto the fourth and 
fifth step determining any potential victory) to what could with a great deal of reservation 
be called “Πpaʙocлaʙʜa этика войны:" the first of these two refers to regret of victory or a 
manifestation of grief that the one defeated is "better" or "stronger" than the victory, and 
has been "unjustly" beaten. The second of these two refers to the negation of victory by 
removing agency or authorship and entitlement ("I have won because I conquered myself," 
                                                          
 
3 The origin of the word 'victory' is the Latin victoria, from vinco, or victus, meaning 'to conquer'. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, 'victory' is '[t]he position or state of having overcome an 
enemy or adversary in combat, battle, or war; supremacy or superiority achieved as the result of 
armed conflict'. The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed, 1989), xix, 610. In English, the word 'victory' 
first appeared in the 14th century, complementing pre-existing terms, such as 'success' or 'vindication 
of rights'. The particular meaning of victory in any specific military campaign obviously depends on 
how the goals of that campaign are defined. Although commonly thought of as the campaigner of 
total wars, the great Prussian strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, observed: "In war many roads lead to 
success, and … they do not all involve the opponent's outright defeat. They range from the destruction 
of the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects 
with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks." Cf. G. 
Blum, "The Fog of Victory," 3. 




or "God was victorious, not me; I am merely His instrument"). The function of this shift in 
position or fictional symbiosis with another who becomes the substantive victor and thus 
erases any notion of defeat is the prevention of retribution and extreme violence against the 





The change in meaning of the term 'victory' and the evolution of various protocols referring 
to victory have to do above all with the changes in the relation towards the enemy. If Thu-
cydides considered victory the complete annihilation of the enemy and the enemy city (Pel-
oponnesian Wars),4 later, after the Crusades of the 13th century, the victor is limited not 
only to not being allowed to kill, but also from destroying the holy sites of the defeated. 
After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the victor's authority is significantly limited: his 
right (ius victoriae) reaches only to the extent of correcting the damage inflicted upon him 
before the conflict or war began.5 This means that the right of the victor is not limited by 
his power and strength to do whatever he can to the defeated, but exclusively by the right to 
remedy the reason the war began in the first place. Still, the idea of the destruction of the 
enemy (their property, remains, body – Clausewitz mentions something he calls a destroy-
ing battle, Vernichungsschlacht) is deeply set in the histories of Judeo-Christianity.6 Two 
                                                          
 
4 "The object taken violently by means of conquest become the property (oikeia kekteisthai) of the 
victorious party." Cf. A. Chaniotis, "Victory' Verdict: The Violent Occupation of Territory in Hellen-
istic Interstate Relations", in: J.-M. Bertrand, ed, La violence dans les mondes grec et romain, Paris 
2005, 456. 
5 Cf. J. Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle. The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War, Bos-
ton, London 2012, Introduction, 1–24. 
6 "What is our aim? . . . . Victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however 
long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival." W. Churchill, Speeches to 
Parliament, "An Address to the House of Commons" (13 May 1940), reprinted in D. Cannadine (ed.), 
Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The Speeches of Winston Churchill (1989), at 149. We encounter this 
same passion for victory in General Alexander Suvorov: Идешь бить неприятеля, умножай 
войска, опорожняй посты, снимай коммуникации. Победивши, обновляй по обстоятельствам, 
но гони его до сокрушения. Преследуй денно и нощно, пока истреблен не будет... 
Недорубленный лес вновь вырастает. Коли быть перипатетиком, то лучше не быть 
солдатом... Победа все покрывает" (When you are preparing to beat the enemy, enlarge your 
troops, vacate the guard posts, remove communication. Once you have won, you can fix as needed, 




arguments regarding limits and the significance of the idea of destruction of the enemy are 
mentioned at the beginning of the last century. In "Ethics of War," and specifically in 
"Wars of Colonization," Bertrand Russell speaks of English fantasies of the destruction of 
Germany: "When the present war began, many people in England imagined that if the Al-
lies were victorious Germany would cease to exist: Germany was to be "destroyed" or 
"smashed", and since these phrases sounded vigorous and cheering, people failed to see that 
they were totally devoid of meaning. There are some seventy million Germans; with great 
good fortune, we might, in a successful war, succeed in killing two millions of them. There 
would then still be sixty-eight million Germans, and in a few years the loss of population 
due to the war would be made good. Germany is not merely a State, but a nation, bound 
together by a common language, common traditions, and common ideals. Whatever the 
outcome of the war, this nation will still exist at the end of it, and its strength cannot be 
permanently impaired. But imagination is what pertains to war is still dominated by Homer 
and the Old Testament."7 
 Since destruction is impossible, it is problematic to see what Georg Simmel is think-
ing when he thematizes "complete or utter victory" (vollständiger Sieg). Complete victory 
or destruction of the enemy can call into question the existence of freedom, as well as the 
existence and cohesion of the victorious group: "Consequently complete victory over its foe 
is not always, in a sociological sense, a fortunate event for a group, because the energy that 
guarantees its cohesiveness thereby declines, and the disintegrative forces that are always at 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
but make sure to chase the enemy down to annihilation. Pursue his day and night, until he is com-
pletely routed… A forest that has not been uprooted will grow again. Even if you are peripatetic in 
your philosophy, you must never be so in your military endeavors… Victory covers everything). A. 
Suvorov, Наука побеждать генералиссимуса Суворова, Moskva, Ripol, 2021, 253. A famous 
passage from a sermon by St. Philaret of Moscow is often cited in a various versions; however, the 
sentence "Гнушайтесь убо врагами Божиими, поражайте врагов отечества, любите враги ваша" 
(Despise the enemy of God, defeat the enemy of the homeland, love thy enemies" (Sveti Filaret, 
"Слова в неделю 19 по Пятидесятнице," Сочинения Филарета, Митрополита Московского, 
Moskva,1873, 264) is bastardized in later citations and interpretations into "Люби врагов своих, 
сокрушай врагов отечества, гнушайся врагами Божиими" (Love thy enemies, crush the enemies 
of the homeland, despise enemies of God"). The imperative "поражайте врагов отечества" (defeat 
the enemies of the homeland) would seem to be synonymous to "beat the enemies of the homeland," 
but is weaker in intensity, turning 'defeating' the enemy into cut off, exclude, strike off, marginalize. 
7 B. Russell, "The Ethics of War," 135. 




work gain ground. The collapse of the Roman-Latin Federation in the fifth century BCE has 
been accounted for by the fact that the common foe was then overcome."8 
 Two or three fragments which I am about to quote, extracted from so-called marginal, 
pseudo-texts (archives, correspondences, interviews, etc.) could show, above all, that peace or 
victory (the beginning or termination of war) is always decided upon by the other (the adver-
sary or enemy). The difficulty with peace and pacifism, really with the beginning or termina-
tion of war, is always about the fiction of the ultimate enemy and our total destruction at his 
hand.9 In 1965, Julien Freund, friend, student, and translator of Carl Schmitt, was defending 
his doctoral thesis, L'Essence du politique (The Essence of the Political), before a committee 
including Raymond Aron, his mentor, as well as Raymond Polin, Paul Ricœur, and Jean 
Hyppolite. Freund writes about the debate with Hyppolite in his 1991 book of interviews: 
"Thus arrives the moment of Hyppolite's intervention. He had acknowledged my work by 
adopting Aron's arms; he found me too severe against Kelsen but then settled on our funda-
mental difference, the source of his refusal. 'Reste la catégorie de l'ami-ennemi définissant la 
politique. Si vous avez vraiment raison, a-t-il affirmé, il ne me reste plus qu'à cultiver mon 
jardin.' ('There remains the category of friend-foe, politically defined. If you are truly correct, 
he said, nothing is left for me but gardening.') To which I said: 'Listen, Mr. Hyppolite, you 
have said two or three times recently that you were wrong about Kelsen. I believe you are 
about to make another mistake, because, like all pacifists, you think that it is up to you to 
designate the enemy (car vous pensez que c'est vous qui désignez l'ennemi, comme tous les 
pacifistes). But, you see, the moment we no longer wish to have enemies, we will not have 
them. (Du moment que nous ne voulons pas d'ennemis, nous n'en aurons pas, raisonnez-
vous). Rather, it is the enemy who designates you as such. (Or c'est l'ennemi qui vous dé-
signe.) And if he wishes to be your enemy, you can treat him as friendly as you like. From the 
moment he wishes you to be his enemy, you indeed are such. And he will even prevent you 
from gardening.' (Et s'il veut que vous soyez son ennemi, vous pouvez lui faire les plus belles 
protestations d'amitié. Du moment qu'il veut que vous soyez l'ennemi, vous l'êtes. Et il vous 
                                                          
 
8 G. Simmel, "Conflict", Sociology. Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms (1908), Leiden, 
Boston 2009, 287. "Darum ist der vollständige Sieg einer Gruppe über ihre Feinde nicht immer ein 
Glück im soziologischen Sinne; denn damit sinkt die Energie, die ihren Zusammenhalt garantiert, und 
die auflösenden Kräfte, die immer an der Arbeit sind, gewinnen an Boden". 
9 "Enmity is the total negation of another being in its complete life action." (Feindschaft ist die totale 
Negation des anderen Seins in allen seinen Lebensbetätigungen), E. Husserl, E III 8, 1934, 12. 




empêchera même de cultiver votre jardin). To tragic effect (Tragique même), because Hyppo-
lite retorted: 'In which case, there is nothing for me to do but commit suicide.' ('Résultat : il ne 
me reste plus qu'à me suicider')."10 
 Franz Rosenzweig's original contribution to histories of war and pacifism, but also 
win-win ethics, can be found at the end of a letter to his parents from January 6, 1917. Immi-
nently after the official offer of peace by Wilhelm II (on December 12, 1916), Rosenzweig 
writes that only then was it clear to him what pacifism was: "Pacifism is in fact – this has 
become clear to me in the past days, since the 12th – necessary equipment of war (not-
wendiges Zubehör des Krieges). So, war is not lead in order to force (zwingen) the enemy 
(Gegner) – it would be impossible for that to last long – but to subjugate (unterwerfen), to 
impose (aufzuzwingen) on him one's own will, to replace (ersetzen) his will with mine. The 
victor does not wish to make a tool (Werkzeug) of the vanquished (because he cannot perse-
vere in it), but rather his slave. The goal of the victor is not the destruction of the enemy (Ver-
nichtung des Feindes), but the basing of a new contract. But this supposes that in the enemy 
there is a shred of a "desire for peace," (Friedenssehnsucht) which has fallen asleep, and the 
mission of the war is to awaken this desire. If this desire for 'peace at all cost' (Frieden um 
jeden Preis) becomes stronger than the ability to suffer (Heroism), then the hour of peace has 
struck. All this of course applies to two victors as it does to one. Therefore, pacifism is 'as old 
as' war (namely, human, slave-directed war (auf Versklavung gerichteter Krieg); animals only 
know a war of destruction (Vernichtungskrieg), and hence have no pacifism."11 
 The third fragment comes from Heidegger's Schwarze Hefte (1939–1941), and was 
probably written in 1939, at the time of Germany's initial war victories. Usually, the defeat 
needs to be accounted for, with the defeated producing sundry justification for his failure. In 
this text, Heidegger justifies the power of the victor. In contrast to Alberto Gentili and other 
founders of international law, Heidegger subordinates law to life and victory, substantively 
binding the two, seeking to find a place for victory outside law. Victory thus becomes every-
thing and to the victor belongs all.12 
                                                          
 
10 J. Freund, L'aventure du politique, Paris 1991, 45. 
11 "F. Rosenzweig an die Eltern," 6. 1. 1917, F. Rosenzweig, Der Mensch und sein Werk, 1. Briefe 
und Tagebücher, Haag 1979. Cf. P. Bojanic, "Pacifism: Equipment or Accessory of War?," in: 
Philosophia, Vol. 41, n. 3, 1038–1040. 
12 The 1980s pop song "The Winner Takes it All," by Abba is a remake of various Christian texts. 
Thus, the last line of Nikolaj Velimirović's (or St. Nikolaj the Serb) famous text "Azbuka Pobede" 




 Victory over an enemy (der Sieg über den Feind) still does not prove that the victor is 
in the right (im Recht ist). However, this "truth" is no longer relevant, if law is interpreted as 
that which is not only confirmed and substantiated (bestätigt und bekräftigt) by victory, but 
above all and primarily established and made (gesetzt und gemacht): right is the power of the 
victor (Recht ist dann die Macht des Siegers), the power of overlordship (die Macht der 
Übermacht). Such law resists "codification" (kodifizieren), since due to its character of power 
and position of victory, it presents new legal reach, interpreted as the "right" to the very "life" 
of the victor.13 
 Although rather diverse, the three fragments are also typical in histories of enmity and 
constituting the figure of the enemy in the West. The determination of the enemy is substan-
tively theological, since his intention is to destroy or disrupt the existing order (C. Schmitt, J. 
Freund). The response to the enemy's enmity is theologically oriented: he must be destroyed 
or else a truce must be made if the enemy abandons his destructive intentions (F. 
Rosenzweig). Of course, peace with a former enemy is always asymmetrical, unfolding with-
in the victor's right of power over the enemy (F. Rosenzweig), power of domination (M. 
Heidegger) that celebrates life. However, how to win in the first place, and what means does 
the victor use to reduce the destructive power of the enemy? 
 
"Coda: Can the Good Guys Win? Revision of a Question or Two" 
 
Borrowing the title of a text by Michael Walzer from a few years ago: "Coda: Can the Good 
Guys Win?,"14 I would like to briefly problematize two close, but sufficiently different ques-
tions, and then attempt to sketch a potentially justified answer. How does the victor achieve 
victory? And, can a man or soldier in war, who acts and evaluates his own actions, remain 
good (a good man), despite all the evil (the inhumanity) that surrounds him? As it stands, 
however, the question in the subheading is not clear because it begs the question why anyone 
would remain good in war or after it? Is there sufficient reason to refer to an individual man or 
all men individually in war, which is foremost a group or institutional activity? Walzer's ques-
                                                                                                                                                   
 
[Alphabet of Victory] from the mid-twentieth century, can be translated as "the winner takes it all" [Ko 
pobijedi, dobice sve]. 
13 M. Heidegger, Überlegungen XII–XV, vol. 96, Frankfurt am Main 2018, 15–16. 
14 M. Walzer, "Coda: Can the Good Guys Win?," in: The European Journal of International Law, 2013, 
Vol. 24, No. 1, 433–444. 




tion is more precise: coda is used in music to indicate an ending of a section or movement, it 
can be a final dilemma or addition to a piece. Thus, Walzer's 'coda' is the consideration 
whether a group of men ('guys') can win by remaining good? What does it mean 'to be good'? 
This difference in number – man, singular, who must remain good (imperative) and a team, a 
crew, a group of people who together must remain good – determines the different ethical 
stance of the Orthodox and Western understanding of the ethics of just war.15 In the former 
case, some man or any man must survive the war and preserve his humanity despite the situa-
tion around him; in the latter case, a group of people ought to first of all win, and the only 
question is whether this will be done by breaking the rules of just war or not. 
 The word 'win' (or 'victory') is an entirely vague protocol (or procedure) that deter-
mines the substantive difference between the two questions I am considering. There is indeed 
no doubt that Walzer's dilemma is entirely rooted in a tradition of Western thought where 
winning is one form of resolution of conflict, entirely opposite to compromise (Simmel) and 
that "victorious war is a social ideal" (Kaufmann).16 Yet, even if the concept is not fully clear, 
it is certain that victory more or less aggressively destroys, perhaps subdues, excludes or 
entirely marginalizes the opponent or the other. On the other hand, it is very complicated to 
speak of victory in the context of an Orthodox ethics of war for many different reasons.17 One 
of the most basic would be that, paradoxically, defeat in war could better preserve the faith 
and religious being of a people. (For example, the "Kosovo Covenant" is the very substance 
of Serbian statehood potential, emerging from a military defeat of the medieval Serbian army 
by the Ottomans; to the Serbs in that battle, so the myth goes, admittance into the kingdom of 
heaven was of far greater importance than victory in war and holding earthly power.) Further, 
it is the Lord who determines the victor, not the strength of people or arms. God is also often a 
                                                          
 
15 The word 'Western' is imprecise, but provisionally covers very different concepts of war ethics, above 
all the Jewish and western Christian. 
16 "Nicht die 'Gemeinschaft frei wollender Menschen', sondern der siegreiche Krieg ist das soziale Ideal: 
der siegreiche Krieg als das letzte Mittel zu jenem obersten Ziel. Im Kriege offenbart sich der Staat in 
seinem wahren Wesen, er ist seine höchste Leistung, in dem seine Eigenart zur vollsten Entfaltung 
kommt." (It is not the "community of free-willed people" [of free-willing people] that is the social ideal, 
but victorious war: victorious war as the final means for the ultimate aim. In war, the state manifests in 
its true being, it is its greatest achievement, and in war its particularity is fully developed.) E. Kaufmann, 
Das Wesen des Volkerrechts, Tűbingen 1911, 140. 
17 The etymology and origin of the Slavic word 'pobeda' (victory) is certainly the first problem. In Max 
Fassmer's etymological dictionary, 'pobeda' is also defeat, disaster, containing the word 'beda' (misery). 




direct participant in the war, just as a war is lost because the actors are unbelievers (St. John 
of Kronstadt).18 This de facto absence of thematization of victory in war and various tech-
niques that construct it carries two crucial consequences for the use of violence and the han-
dling of amount of violence. In his "The Science of Victory," Suvorov is explicit in prohibit-
ing unjustified killing, since a soldier is simply not a criminal ("and God does not aid crimi-
nals"). Interestingly, Russian and then Soviet military leaders principally repeat a fairly uni-
vocal repertoire of an Orthodox understanding of justified violence. At this point, there is no 
difference between Michael Walzer's attempt to secure the conditions for the good guys to 
truly have a chance at ultimate victory. In the conclusion of his text, Walzer writes: "Soldiers 
have to be trained to fight justly, and their officers have to be taught the best ways of doing 
that. It is incompetence, above all, that breeds brutality. There is plenty of spontaneous brutal-
ity in war, especially 'in the heat of the battle'; I do not mean to ignore that. But well-trained 
and well-disciplined armies are less brutal – and their officers and soldiers are less likely to 
think that brutality is necessary for victory."19  
 It seems to me that the phrase or institution of so-called "defensive killing," in use in 
the last ten years across various texts having to do with just war theory, is a good explanation 
how to regulate brutality of violent acts. Still, the problem does not only lie with violence 
done in affect ('in the heat of the battle'), whether individual or group, but the level-headed 
and strategic production of brutal violence and the violation of the rules of war to some end 
(or to achieve victory).20 
                                                          
 
18 In Missionary Letter 277, Nikolaj Velimirović addresses a writer from Zagreb on war: "You ask: if 
God allows such misery to happen to people, where is the soothing wisdom of the Savior? On paper. On 
paper of those who in their peacetime wicked deeds cause war. Were the soothing wisdom of the Savior 
in human hearts, people would live in perpetual peace." [Vi pitate: Kad Bog dopusta takvu nesrecu na 
ljude, gde je onda blaga nauka Spasiteljeva? Na hartiji. Na hartiji kod onih koji nedelima svojim u miru 
izazivaju rat. A kad bi ta blaga nauka Spasiteljeva bila u srcima ljudskim, ljudi bi ziveli u trajnome 
miru.] https://svetosavlje.org/misionarska-pisma/ 
19 M. Walzer, "Coda: Can the Good Guys Win?," 442. 
20 Walzer's dilemma originates in a 1973 text, "The Problem of Dirty Hands," published in Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No.2, 1973, 160–180. The problem is actually quotidian. Walzer writes: "He 
wants to win the election, someone says, but he doesn't want to get his hands dirty." Walzer is evoking 
Machiavelli's famous conclusion that the ruler or commander must learn "how not to be good," since the 
world contains "so many who are not good." This is the first condition of victory and social success. 
"Any man who tries to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are 
not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his authority must learn how not to be good (potere essere 




 The second consequence of introducing or not introducing the institution of victory 
refers to the distinction between individual and group violence. War is not an individual mat-
ter, and individuals mostly do not determine the outcome of war. A clear beginning and aim 
of conflict, as well as ritual of victory at the end of war can protect from exclusion those indi-
viduals who 'successfully' and 'efficiently' use brutal violence.21 Not only this: victory implies 
legitimizing of jointly breaking just war rules or an individual's 'inhuman acts', indeed incor-
porating them as necessary for the survival of the group as such. If it is victorious, which 
means if it still exists, a group is never built on unjust principles. Victory is then a condition 
for a group not to dissolve and vice versa: only a group still in existence after certain collec-
tive acts by its members or by the group as a whole (can a group be an agent?) has fulfilled 
the social ideal of victory. 
 The significance of Walzer's dilemma regarding dirty hands is later transformed into 
much more complicated protocols of supreme emergency and asymmetric warfare.22 What is 
important for us is to affirm the difficulty, even impossibility of strictly following the rules in 
unpredictable conflicts and contexts. Yet, they are our only reality today. I suggest a sketch of 
a few variations of answers to the first two questions from the beginning: it is not possible to 
remain human while participating in (or being responsible for) situations below the humane 
threshold; victory conceals the brutality of individuals, while at the same time necessarily 
implying the existence of a certain amount of "bad acts" it accumulates and archives; good 
guys can win because the bad acts of individuals actually sometimes have a crucial role in 
victory and the existence of a group. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
non buono), and use that knowledge, or refrain from using it, as necessity requires." N. Machiavelli, The 
Prince, ch. 15, 57; N. Machiavelli, Il Principe, Roma, Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013, 115. 
21 In the 1973 text, Walzer quotes Basil the Great: "Killing in war was differentiated by our fathers from 
murder… nevertheless, perhaps it would be well that those whose hands are unclean abstain from com-
munion for three years." Ibid, 167. 
22 Walzer is disturbed by real problems faced by soldiers and citizens. For example, The New York 
Times in 2010 reports of a soldier complaining about the rules of engagement in Afghanistan, specifical-
ly the difficulties in winning the war. M Walzer, "Coda: Can the Good Guys Win?", 433. In a 2015 
interview, Walzer explicitly talks about the problem of asymmetric warfare and victory: "It is possible to 
win asymmetric wars, as the Sri Lankans proved against the Tamil Tiger rebels, but only if you are 
prepared to kill high numbers of civilians and the world isn't watching. But you can't win if you are 
trying to fight according to the moral rules of engagement. That is the general problem of asymmetric 
warfare." M. Walzer, "Interview," in: Journal of Political Thought, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2015), 61. 




"To slay or defeat a better man" 
 
In Ex Captivitate Salus, published immediately upon his 1946 interrogation in Nürnberg, Carl 
Schmitt recalls: "In the autumn of 1940, as France lay defeated on the ground, I had a discus-
sion with a Yugoslavian, the Serbian poet Ivo Andrić, whom I love very much. We had met in 
a shared connoisseurship (in einer gemeinsamen Kennerschaft) and in the veneration of Léon 
Bloy. The Serb told me the following story from the mythology of his people: Marko 
Kraljević, the hero of the Serbian saga, fought for an entire day with a powerful Turk and laid 
him out after a hard struggle. As he killed the defeated enemy (den besiegten Feind), a serpent 
that had been sleeping upon the heart of the dead man awoke and spoke to Marko: You were 
lucky that I slept through your battle. Then the hero cried out: Woe is me! I killed a man who 
was stronger than me! (Weh mir, ich habe einen Mann getötet, der stärker war als ich!) I 
retold this story to some friends and acquaintances at the time and also to Ernst Jünger, who 
was stationed as an officer of the army of occupation in Paris. We were all deeply impressed. 
(Wir waren alle tief beeindruckt.) But it was clear to us that the victors of today do not allow 
themselves to be impressed (nicht beeindrucken lassen) by such medieval stories. This, too, 
belongs to your great prognosis, poor, defeated Tocqueville!"23 
 Speaking to Schmitt, Ivo Andrić, then ambassador of Yugoslavia in Berlin and later 
winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, describes Marko Kraljević, perhaps the greatest 
Serbian hero and "victor," responsible for the construction of the "authentically traditional" 
(mythological or "Serbian"). Almost certainly in the presence of Schmitt's wife, Duška Todo-
rović (who often recited and translated Serbian poems to Schmitt), Andrić evokes one of the 
most famous epic poems in the Serbian cannon ("Marko Kralyevich and Musa the Highway-
man"), reconstructing an entirely dubitable victory of Marko over the 'Turkish' knight Musa 
Kesedžija (Musa the Highwayman). The epilogue is described faithfully, with the conclusion 
and Schmitt's strong impression certainly justified:   
 
When Marko Kralyevich saw this, he wept 
And bitter tears flowed down upon his face. 
"Dear God!" he cried, "Have a mercy on my soul! 
                                                          
 
23 C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, ed. A. Kalyvas & F. Finchelstein, Cambridge 2017, 30–31; C. 
Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, Köln 1950, 32–33. 




(Jaoh mene do boga miloga) 
For I have slain a better man than me!"24 
 
 Today's victors could certainly and perhaps would have to follow the "science of victo-
ry," which we might inscribe into an ideal register of an Orthodox war ethics. In it, the victor 
is earnestly remorseful for breaking certain rules of the duel or war, he addresses the Lord 
seeking absolution, and perhaps even promises that he will be gracious in the future, that is, 
will not behave as the cruel victors of today (this is Schmitt's point). Marko the hero avows 
that his enemy did not break the rules of engagement like he himself did, nor asked for the 
help of others. This story of victory is a construction of a stylized Orthodox viewpoint, and 
contains a few elements that it is necessary to briefly list: a) the idea of help – victory is al-
ways with another, with an additional: God,25 guardian angel, snake, material means, secret 
ally, secret weapon; b) victory has multiple authors or is composed of multiple actors who 
share responsibility, while the ultimate decision is made by God, the supreme being; c) the 
science of victory or science how to win is in the victor's self-effacement. 
 The glorious example of a negative hero or negative victor, Marko, does not have to 
necessarily be devalued by everything we find in the aforementioned poem itself, in the sec-
tions before or after the verses evoked here, that is, by Andrić and Schmitt. Finally, why is the 
Serbian hero so distressed? Is it that the poem only vaguely shows the actual enmity between 
Marko and Musa – who is the real Serb, and who a Turkish vassal? Who is who here, and 
what is the nature of their enmity? The Romantic principle emphasized by Andrić (Schmitt) is 
seen in a different light when we consider the "facts" that Marko was "lost" and nearly defeat-
ed, that the battle took place on a Sunday, that he killed Musa with a hidden knife, that he 
deployed secret, rogue means (in contrast to his enemy), that he sought help not of God, but 
of his guardian angel, etc. Here, then, is how the poem ends, that is, what follows after Mar-
ko's remorse, his tears and prayer to God. 
 
                                                          
 
24 The Serbian Epic Ballads. An Anthology, trans. G. N. W. Locke, Belgrade 1997, 201. 
25 "Adhere to Him, and with thoughts of victory step boldly forward. God in you will be victorious in 
your stead. To Him ascribe your victories, for yourself preserve joy." Sveti Nikolaj Srpski, "Alphabet of 
Victory." https://svetosavlje.org/azbuka-pobede/. Emperor Constantine's victory over Maxentius in 312 
CE is preceded by Constantine's mystical experience in which the stars in the sky made a cross brighter 
than the Sun, and inscribed with the Greek words "touto nika" (in this sign is victory). 




He cut off Musa's head and put it in 
Sharats' (his horse) nosebag. He mounted then, and rode 
Back to the shining city of Stambol (Istanbul). 
 
He threw the head of Musa down before 
The Sultan's feet – who started up in dread. 
Said Marko: "My lord Sultan, do not fear! 
Think how you would have welcomed him alive, 
When you do flinch to see his face in death!" 
 
The Sultan gave him three great sacks of gold. 
Marko returned to Prilep, that fair town (Serbia). 
Musa remained alone at Kachanik.26  
 
 The poem ends with the one defeated still present, immortal in a sense, still lying 
where he was slain. The idea of the impossibility of complete destruction and annihilation 
of the enemy or injustice implies that complete victory is actually impossible, even despite 
the willingness of the victor to first produce unjust acts and at the same time seek remorse 
for them. It would seem that such protocols are something entirely new in complicated 
histories of justice and victory. 
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